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[L. A. No. 25583. In Bank. Jan. 19, 1960.] 
MARIE WEBER, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; PAUL D. 
WEBER, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Divorce-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Right to Alimony.-An 
ex parte foreign divorce decree, even if valid, cannot deprive 
a California court of jurisdiction to enforce support rights 
held under the laws of California at the time of divorce. 
[2] Id.-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Right to Alimony.-Since a 
wife may maintain her action for permanent alimony without 
attacking her husband's ex parte divorce decree obtained in 
another state, she may receive temporary alimony, costs and 
fees to enable her to continue the suit when she has shown 
that she needs such relief and that the husband has the ability 
to provide such assistance. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 312 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 972 et seq. 
McX. Dig. References: [1-3] Divorce, § 304; [4] Mandamus, § 36. 
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[8] Id. - Foreign Divorce - Eifect on Right to Alimony. - Where 
the divorce court of a sister state in granting the husband an 
ex parte divorce decree has no jurisdiction to terminate the 
wife's right to support under California law, it is immaterial 
whether the wife's action for divorce and permanent alimony 
was filed before or after the divorce decree of the sister state 
became final; in either case the sister state has no jurisdiction. 
[4] Mandamus-To Courts.-A writ of mandate may properly be 
used to compel the superior court to exercise its jurisdiction 
though its refusal to do so is based on the considered but er-
roneous belief that it has no jurisdiction as a matter of law to 
grant the relief requested, if no other adequate remedy exists. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County to hear and determine an order to 
show cause why petitioner should not receive temporary ali-
mony, costs and fees in her divorce action. Writ granted. 
Newell & Chester, Robert M. Newell and Theodore A. 
Chester for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamo-
reaux, Assistant County Counsel, Edward A. Nugent and 
David Bernard, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
Joslyn & Joslyn, J. M. Joslyn and R. B. Joslyn for Real 
Party in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate com-
pelling respondent superior court to hear and determine on the 
merits an order to show cause why she should not receive tem-
porary alimony, costs, and fees in her action for divorce 
against the real party in interest. 
Petitioner (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) and the 
real party in interest (hereinafter referred to as defendant) 
were married in Los Angeles on October 4, 1940, and resided 
there until early in 1950. At that time they moved to Morocco, 
North Africa, where defendant was employed by the United 
States Corps of Engineers. About 1952 at defendant's request 
plaintiff returned to their home in Los Angeles. Thereafter 
defendant unsuccessfully attempted to procure a divorce from 
plaintiff in the Consular Court of the United States in Morocco. 
In 1956 he returned to the United States and took up residence 
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tiff in that state, serving her by publication. The Nevada court 
granted an ex parte divorce to defendant on August 16, 1956. 
Defendant then proceeded to Los Angeles, where he married 
his present wife and where they now reside. 
Plaintiff filed her action for divorce and permanent alimony 
in respondent court on March 17, 1959. She obtained an order 
to show cause why she should not be awarded temporary ali-
mony, costs, and fees. At the hearing on this order, defendant 
objected to the introduction of any evidence as to plaintiff's 
need for the award or his ability to pay it on the ground that 
his ex parte divorce constituted a complete defense to plain-
tiff's motion. Respondent court sustained defendant's objec-
tion and entered its minute order as follows: 
"For the purpose of this hearing, there is found to be a 
valid decree of divorce between the parties and there is no 
present marriage between the parties hereto. The Court is 
without jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for." 
[1] Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Ca1.2d 735, 745 [344 P.2d 
295], establishes that an ex parte divorce decree, even if valid, 
cannot deprive a California court of jurisdiction to enforce 
support rights held under the laws of California at the time 
of the divorce. Defendant contends, however, that even if 
respondent court has jurisdiction under the Hudson case to 
award plaintiff permanent alimony, its jurisdiction to award 
her temporary alimony and attorney's fees nevertheless de-
pends on an existing marriage under Civil Code, sections 137.2 
and 137.3. This contention was raised and expressly answered 
adversely to defendant in the Hudson case. (Hudson v. Hud-
son, supra, at 744-745.) [2] Our conclusion in that case 
that" [s]ince plaintiff may maintain her action for permanent 
alimony without attacking defendant's Idaho decree, it follows 
that she may receive temporary alimony, costs, and fees to 
enable her to continue the suit when she has shown that she 
needs such relief and that defendant has the ability to provide 
such assistance" (Hudson v. Hudson, sttpra, at (745) also 
governs here. 
[3] Defendant contends, however, that this case is dis-
tinguishable from the Hudson case because plaintiff filed her 
action for divorce and permanent alimony nearly three years 
after defendant's Nevada decree became final. In the Hudson 
case, the wife filed her action for divorce approximatel~' one 
month before her husband filed his ex parte action in Idaho. 
Defendant urges that, although the husband'8 divorce decree 
became final prior to the hearing on the order to show cause 
) 
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in Hudson, the California court had nevertheless already ac-
quired jurisdiction of the wife's action and was thereby em-
powered to award relief to her. The Hudson decision, however, 
was not based on the fact that the California court first ac-
quired jurisdiction but on the ground that the Idaho court had 
no jurisdiction to terminate the wife's right to support. Simi-
larly, the Nevada court had no such jurisdiction here. (Hudson 
v. Hudson, supra, at 741-745.) 
[ 4] The writ of mandate may properly be used to compel 
respondent court to exercise its jurisdiction even though its 
refusal to do so is "based on the considered but erroneous 
belief that it has no jurisdiction as a matter of law to grant the 
relief requested" (Robinson v. Superior Oourt, 35 Ca1.2d 379, 
383-387 [218 P.2d 10]), if no other adequate remedy exists 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1086). Since no purpose but delay 
would be served at this time by reviewing the District Court 
of Appeal's decision when it issued the alternative writ that 
the remedy by appeal was inadequate, we accept it for the pur-
pose of this proceeding. (Atkinson v. Superior 001trt, 49 
Ca1.2d 338, 342 [316 P.2d 960] ; Bowles v. Superior Oourt, 44 
Ca1.2d 574, 582 [283 P.2d 704] ; cf. Oity of Los Angeles v. 
Superior Oourt, 51 Ca1.2d 423,429 [333 P.2d 745].) 
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., 
and Tobriner, J., pro tem.,· concurred • 
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